Structural inequalities reinforced by socio-economic disparities, corruption, bad governance and unequal regional development have generated 'structural violence' of which a large chunk of the population including those from the Tarai/Madhesh is a victim. Laying a foundation for addressing structural violence should, therefore, be a major goal of constitution writing. However, with violence, chaos and extremism emerging from ongoing protests and street demonstrations in the Tarai (for which both the government and the agitating groups are equally responsible), the Tarai region provide an example of how the failure to deal with the discontent of social groups can create an opportunity in which 'structural violence' leads to 'direct violence'. With a month-long strike, protests and violence, leaving almost 40 people dead, the pattern of conflict is rapidly changing in Tarai.

Generally speaking, the conflict there is mostly vertical, between marginalized and excluded social groups and the state. Nonetheless, recent episodes of violence have produced hate and anger which is gradually turning the pattern of conflict to become horizontal, between social, ethnic and caste groups. Therefore, deteriorating social harmony and lack of law and order put the government and the agitating parties under mounting pressure to find solutions to the current impasse through dialogue. The Tharuhat-Tharuwan Joint Struggle Committee has formed a three-member dialogue committee while the government and the Madheshi Morcha will have to come to dialogue, sooner or later.

People expect the dialogue this time to be 'final', putting an end to violence and breaking the political impasse; the country cannot afford more violence. In the past, dialogues were often 'ceremonial', mainly concentrated on division of power among political elites, which have produced more than 40 agreements. Many of these agreements are contradictory and part of the current problem. At this critical juncture, a key question is what makes dialogue different this time? Put it differently, what makes dialogue pragmatic? How can dialogue address people's concern and that of political elites? There are two points to consider.

The first is building trust and gaining public confidence. The dialogue will fail if both sides do not manage their expectations and build mutual trust before coming to the table. Both sides, whether the Samyukta Loktantrik Madheshi Morcha and the government or the Tharuhat-Tharuwan Joint Struggle Committee and the government, should do proper homework to assess what can be achieved immediately and in the long-term. With calls for a dialogue with the Madhesi Morcha while still allowing the army to march, the government seems to have a mixed strategy of using both carrots and stick to resolve the crisis. But the government must understand that dialogue cannot take place amid fear and insecurity. Excessive use of force, whether legitimate or illegitimate, is antithetical to trust-building. On the other hand, Madheshi Morcha has put forth four conditions for dialogue, including implementation of past agreements signed with Madheshis, Janajatis, Adivasis, Tharus and Dalits. This condition seems to be a 'time buying' strategy of Morcha. Even Morcha leaders are aware that the government cannot fulfil all its demands since a) the past agreements are often contradictory and, b) honouring some agreements will require long-term commitments which will obviously be the duty of successive governments.

As the government is preparing to recall the army and as the door for dialogue is still open, Madheshi Morcha must relinquish their stubbornness and utilize the opportunity to engage in dialogue to work out a 'safe landing' from the protests which are becoming increasingly violent and going out of the leaders' control. The second point is social justice as a common vision and goal. Jana Andolan II and the Tarai uprising in 2007 established a discourse of 'social justice' in the country. Accordingly, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Interim Constitution are historical documents that safeguard and institutionalize people's aspiration for change and social justice. However, a fundamental problem of the current peace process is that bargaining for power has often overshadowed debates on how to address historical social injustices. Regardless of caste, ethnicity and class, there are commonalities in terms of what people expect from the peace process: equality, equity, dignity, respect, security, equal opportunities (in both economic and political terms) and equitable participation in governance and development.

The goal is not to divide the society but to connect people of different social and cultural backgrounds. Initially, when the idea of federalism was included in the Interim Constitution, it was thought of as a tool to achieve social justice. Theoretically, federalism is not and should not be a vehicle of social and national disintegration. However, in Nepal, the federal discourse is politicized and ethnicized in such a way that different political actors have their own politicized narratives and interpretations on how social justice can be achieved. The politicization of the social justice movement has produced 'ethnic others' and divided the society like never before. Anyone with a different modality to address social injustice by separating the issues from ethnic and identity politics was branded a supporter of the status quo. As a result, 'the politics of negation' never allowed the discussion on social justice and federalism to mature.

A reductionist idea that flourished under the shadow of identity politics equates social justice to a political project that can only survive in an ethnic- and identity-based federal system. During the Maoist insurgency, the Maoists' ethnic modality was instrumental in the recruitment of combatants from their Tharuhat, Magrat, Tamsaling and New provinces. Even the Maoists were not convinced social injustices in Nepal could be addressed by disconnecting class from caste, where some social groups (for example Newars) overlap between caste, ethnicity and class. But even today, the debate on social injustice is distorted by divisive politics and the old strategy of mobilization developed by the Maoists is being recycled to provoke people from Tharuhat, Madhesh and eastern hills. Madheshis have been fighting for effective, non-discriminatory and efficient public service delivery and equal rights, justice, equality, equity and dignity. The demarcation of federal boundaries isn't the only factor that provoked Madheshis.

An overwhelming number of Madheshis are unhappy with the citizenship provision in the draft constitution, which makes it difficult for children of a single Nepali parent to get citizenship with the same rights as those who receive citizenship by descent. Thus, social justice is still central to the federal discourse whereas, for the divisive politics, it is the size, boundaries and demarcation of future federal units that matter more. This shifting dynamic provides a special clue for future dialogue: make social justice central agenda of negotiation and find ways to integrate social justice in the discourse of constitution writing and state-building. The author is a researcher focusing on the issues of conflict, peace, security and development.